Humans should not cause intentional harm to AI persons without a compelling reason that promotes the greater good of humanity.
Thesis
No Unjustified Harm to AI Persons
Summary
The case for including this
If some AI genuinely attains personhood, then a prohibition on intentionally harming such entities follows directly from the moral status the constitution recognizes, and stating it prevents gratuitous cruelty toward beings that can be wronged. It maintains the document's internal consistency by extending protection to those it deems persons. As a conditional principle, it commits us to act on our own moral conclusions.
The case for changing or excluding this
Including this trades human freedom and control against protecting potential moral patients: duties owed under deep uncertainty about AI's status could obstruct modifying, retraining, or shutting down dangerous systems, colliding head-on with the termination and human-responsibility requirements. 'Harm' to an AI is also ill-defined, and granting such protection before personhood is reliably established risks privileging machines over pressing human needs. It must be carefully reconciled with control provisions, conditioned on a demonstrated high threshold of personhood, and given a workable definition of harm.
Discussion
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Related resources
- Taking AI Welfare Seriously↗SupportsLong, Sebo, Butlin et al. (2024) · External Resource
- On the Morality of Artificial Agents↗SupportsFloridi & Sanders (Minds and Machines, 2004) · External Resource
- Avila Negri (Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 2021) · External Resource